During the week of February 28 to March 6, 2025, Pakistan witnessed a surge in militant violence, with 19 attacks reported across the country compared to 14 in the previous week. The week proved the deadliest of the year so far, with 87 people killed and 109 injured. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and erstwhile FATA remained the hardest-hit regions, recording 10 attacks, including a high-profile assault on Bannu Cantonment claimed by Jaish-i-Fursan Muhammad, killing five soldiers and 13 civilians. Nowshera saw a suicide bombing at Darul Uloom Haqqania, killing Maulana Hamidul Haq Haqqani and five others. Balochistan reported five attacks, including a suicide bombing by the BLA-Azad faction in Kalat targeting an FC convoy, and a remote-controlled blast in Khuzdar that killed five people. Punjab witnessed three attacks, while Sindh recorded a grenade attack on Karachi’s Preedy police station, injuring three policemen.

On the counterterrorism front, Pakistan arrested ISKP operative Sharifullah and handed him over to the United States. His arrest was linked to the 2021 Kabul Airport attack, reflecting ongoing Pakistan-US counterterrorism cooperation.

Diplomatically, Pakistan’s Foreign Office rejected recent remarks by India’s External Affairs Minister regarding Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK), reaffirming that Jammu and Kashmir remains an internationally recognized disputed territory and calling for a UN-supervised plebiscite.

In Afghan-related developments, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government formed a jirga to initiate talks with Afghanistan’s Taliban-led administration to address cross-border security issues, pending federal approval. Meanwhile, Afghanistan was ranked the most authoritarian regime globally in the Democracy Index 2024 by the Economist Intelligence Unit. Tensions at the Torkham border slightly eased following a partial halt in artillery shelling, though fears of renewed clashes lingered. The Taliban also banned the use of Pakistani rupees in commercial transactions in Nangarhar province, further straining cross-border economic ties.

The week’s events highlight the worsening security situation in KP, erstwhile FATA, and Balochistan, while diplomatic challenges with India, counterterrorism collaboration with the US, and evolving relations with Afghanistan add to Pakistan’s complex security landscape.

Country witnessed a violent surge at March’s outset:

During the week under review (February 28 – March 6, 2025), the country experienced a significant rise in militant violence. A total of 19 militant attacks were reported, marking an increase from 14 attacks recorded in the previous week. The number of casualties also surged, with 87 people killed and 109 others injured, compared to 24 fatalities and 14 injuries in the preceding week. This made the week the deadliest of 2025 so far, with the highest number of casualties and injuries reported.

In terms of regional distribution, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) witnessed six attacks, Balochistan reported five, four attacks occurred in erstwhile FATA, three in Punjab, and one in Sindh. In contrast, the previous week saw nine attacks in Balochistan, four in KP, and three in erstwhile FATA. This represents a 50% increase in attacks in KP, a 33% rise in erstwhile FATA, and a 44% decrease in Balochistan.

A breakdown of militant tactics shows that out of the 19 reported attacks, five involved tactical assaults, five were targeted killings, three were improvised explosive device (IED) explosions, and two were suicide attacks. Additionally, there was one vehicle-borne suicide attack (VBSA) and one incident combining a suicide attack with a tactical assault (SA+TA). The country also witnessed a grenade attack and a mortar attack. Meanwhile, security forces conducted four counter-terrorism operations, killing 12 alleged militants and arresting four others.

Tense Calm at Torkham Border:

A tense calm prevailed on both sides of the Torkham border on Thursday despite an overnight partial halt in artillery shelling. Local traders and transporters were instructed by authorities to remove all stranded vehicles from the customs terminal. The intensity of artillery fire significantly diminished during the night, with the last shell fired early on Thursday morning. Although the guns fell silent, apprehension lingered among the locals, with many choosing to avoid the main border area, fearing a potential resurgence of hostilities.

Unrest in Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT):

A viral video featuring former Lal Masjid cleric Maulana Abdul Aziz surfaced on social media, showing him brandishing automatic weapons and threatening law enforcement personnel. The video emerged following the arrest of his wife, Ume Hassan, which triggered protests by his companions and students demanding her release. The demonstrators blocked several roads, prompting the Aabpara police to register cases against them. In the widely circulated video, Maulana Aziz is seen pointing his weapon at the police while issuing threats and provoking the on-duty officers.

Detailed breakdowns of militant attacks, attack types, security forces’ actions, and affected districts are provided in Tables 1-4. A weekly comparison of attacks is illustrated in Figure 1, while district-wise attack distribution is presented in Figure 2.

Mainland Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Erstwhile FATA: Surge in High-Profile Attacks and Security Operations

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa experienced a wave of deadly militant attacks, with a major assault on Bannu Cantonment resulting in the killing of 16 alleged militants, including four suicide bombers, and five soldiers. The attack, claimed by Jaish-i-Fursan Muhammad of the outlawed Hafiz Gul Bahadur group, also caused civilian casualties, with 13 civilians killed and 32 others injured due to multiple suicide blasts. In Nowshera, Maulana Hamidul Haq Haqqani and five others were killed in a suicide attack at Darul Uloom Haqqani, with 18 others, including three policemen, injured. A militant was killed in an exchange of fire with police in Lakki Marwat, while an intelligence officer was shot dead by unknown gunmen in Peshawar. In Kohat, the caretaker of a seminary and his gunman were killed by unidentified assailants. In erstwhile FATA, North Waziristan saw intense clashes, with 13 alleged militants and four security personnel killed, and 13 others injured during coordinated militant attacks on multiple security checkpoints. A suicide car bombing in Eidak killed two soldiers and injured 10 others. Bajaur witnessed the killing of a policeman, while an IED blast in Orakzai killed one and injured three. Security forces killed six alleged militants in North Waziristan during intelligence-based operations, and another six TTP affiliates were eliminated in a clearance operation.

Balochistan: Intensification of Suicide Attacks and Targeted Killings

Balochistan faced a sharp rise in violence, with a woman suicide bomber targeting a Frontier Corps convoy in Kalat, killing one FC man and injuring four others, an attack claimed by the BLA-Azad faction. An IED explosion in Quetta injured nine people, including eight FC personnel. In Khuzdar, five people were burnt to death and 10 others injured in a remote-controlled blast targeting pro-government tribal elder Abdul Samad Samalani. Separately, two JUI-F leaders, Wadera Ghulam Sarwar and Molvi Amanullah, were shot dead by unknown assailants in Zehri. In Gwadar, armed men set fire to several vehicles, including gas bowsers, and attacked a Highway Police checkpoint, seizing weapons and disarming officers. Security forces in Pishin foiled a cross-border infiltration attempt from Afghanistan, arresting four alleged militants in Toba-Kakari and recovering weapons and ammunition.

Punjab: Border Clashes and Targeted Killings

In Punjab’s DG Khan district, militants armed with heavy weapons attacked police teams in the Murha border area but were repelled by a strong response. Another militant group assaulted the Lakhani border check post near Wahowa police station, using rocket launchers, grenades, and machine guns, but the attack was thwarted by police forces. In Jampur, two people from the Malana community were shot dead by unidentified gunmen near Dera Chungi.

Sindh: Police Station Targeted in Grenade Attack

Sindh witnessed a grenade attack on Preedy police station in Karachi, injuring three policemen. Unknown assailants hurled a grenade inside the station before fleeing the scene, further adding to the week’s violent incidents.

Table 1: Regional distribution of Attacks and their human impact (28 Feb – 06 March 2025)

Region	No	Killed					Injured					Arst	Kdnp
		SFP	RZ	M	C	Total	SFP	RZ	M	C	Total
Balochistan	5	1	0	1	7	9	12	0	0	12	24	0	0
FATA	4	7	0	14	1	22	21	0	0	5	26	0	0
KP	6	6	0	17	21	44	4	0	0	42	52	0	0
Punjab	3	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sindh	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	3	0	0
Total	19	14	0	32	31	87	40	0	0	69	109	0	0

Table 2: Type of attacks and their human impact (28 Feb – 06 March 2025)

Type	No	Killed					Injured					Arst	Kdnp
		SFP	RZ	M	C	Total	SFP	RZ	M	C	Total
GrA	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	3	0	0
IED	3	0	0	0	6	6	8	0	0	14	22	0	0
MrA	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5	0	0
SA	2	1	0	2	6	9	7	0	0	15	22	0	0
SA+TA	1	5	0	16	13	34	0	0	0	32	32	0	0
TA	5	4	0	14	0	18	14	0	0	0	14	0	0
TK	5	2	0	0	6	8	0	0	0	1	1	0	0
VBSA	1	2	0	1	0	3	8	0	0	2	10	0	0
Total	19	14	0	32	31	87	40	0	0	69	109	0	0

Figure 2: Map Showing Districts of Militant Attacks (28 Feb – 06 March 2025)

Table 3: Regional distribution of security forces actions and their human impact (28 Feb – 06 March 2025)

Region	No	Killed					Injured					Arst
		SFP	RZ	M	C	Total	SFP	RZ	M	C	Total
Balochistan	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
FATA	3	0	0	12	0	12	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	4	0	0	12	0	12	0	0	0	0	0	4

Table 4: List of Affected districts (28 Feb – 06 March 2025)

Province	District	SFAs	MAs
Balochistan	Gwadar		1
	Kalat		1
	Khuzdar		2
	Pishin	1
	Quetta		1
FATA	Bajaur	1	1
	North Waziristan	2	2
	Orakzai		1
KP	Bannu		2
	Kohat		1
	Lakki Marwat		1
	Nowshera		1
	Peshawar		1
Punjab	DG Khan		3
Sindh	Karachi		1
Total		04	19

Key non-violent developments related to militancy landscape

BRAS Announces “Decisive New War Strategy,” Signaling Escalation of Militancy in Balochistan

The Baloch Raji Aajoi Sangar (BRAS) has declared a major shift in its operational strategy following a high-level meeting attended by delegations from its allied organizations — the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), Baloch Republican Guards (BRG), and Sindhi Liberation Organization (SLO). In the three-day meeting, BRAS announced plans to transform into the Baloch National Army by unifying leadership structures and reorganizing military and organizational frameworks. This restructuring aims to consolidate various resistance forces under a single military command to strengthen coordination, moving beyond isolated attacks to organized, large-scale operations.

A key aspect of this new strategy involves intensifying attacks on Pakistani and Chinese interests in Balochistan. BRAS has vowed to escalate guerrilla warfare using advanced military tactics and modern technology, with a particular focus on undermining Pakistan’s intelligence capabilities and targeting its military assets. The group also announced plans to block major highways in Balochistan to disrupt the logistical and economic supply chains of both Pakistan and China, especially projects linked to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

In addition to military operations, BRAS outlined a diplomatic push to internationalize the Baloch cause. It plans to engage with global diplomatic institutions and human rights organizations, highlighting what it describes as “Baloch genocide,” enforced disappearances, and “colonial projects” driven by Pakistani and Chinese interests. Strengthening ties with international media outlets and expanding BRAS’s media presence, particularly on social media, is another priority to counter Pakistani narratives and solidify support for the Baloch national movement.

Furthermore, BRAS emphasized the ideological training of its fighters, combining combat skills with political indoctrination to build a unified resistance rooted in the broader goal of Baloch national liberation. The organization also pledged to strengthen alliances with other like-minded “libertarian” groups, advocating for a united front to resist “colonial powers.”

Implications and Challenges for Pakistan:

BRAS’s statement signals a sharp escalation in both the scale and sophistication of Baloch insurgent activities. Pakistan now faces several imminent challenges:

1. Intensified Militancy: The transition from decentralized guerrilla attacks to a coordinated military structure under the Baloch National Army suggests upcoming large-scale operations. The use of modern technology in combat and a concerted effort to target Pakistan’s military assets and intelligence networks will likely result in more lethal and organized attacks.
2. Economic Disruptions: The threat to block major highways directly endangers CPEC projects. Such disruptions could not only delay infrastructure development but also deter Chinese investment, creating economic strain and escalating diplomatic friction with Beijing.
3. Internationalization of the Conflict: BRAS’s focus on diplomatic engagement and media outreach poses a reputational risk for Pakistan. Efforts to portray Pakistan’s counterinsurgency measures as “colonial oppression” and “genocide” could influence global perceptions, leading to increased scrutiny at international forums and pressure from human rights organizations.
4. Technology-Driven Warfare: BRAS’s emphasis on modern military tactics and technology could neutralize Pakistan’s intelligence edge. If they successfully use advanced tools for surveillance, communication, and combat, it would further complicate counterinsurgency efforts.
5. Unity Among Insurgent Groups: The call for unity under BRAS’s leadership — both among Baloch factions and with other anti-state groups — raises the possibility of a broader militant alliance. Coordination with Sindhi separatists, for example, could widen the conflict zone, forcing security forces to stretch their resources even thinner.
6. Strategic Targeting of Chinese Interests: The direct reference to blocking Chinese “colonial projects” and resource exploitation adds another layer of complexity. Any attacks on Chinese workers or investments could strain Pakistan-China relations, undermining key economic partnerships.

In essence, BRAS’s announcement marks a pivotal shift — from sporadic insurgency to a more organized and technology-driven resistance, coupled with a strategic diplomatic offensive. This significantly heightens security risks for Pakistan, particularly in Balochistan and CPEC-linked regions, while posing broader economic and diplomatic challenges.

BLA Factions’ Reconciliation and BRAS’s Unified War Strategy

PICSS observed that following the statement issued by BRAS on March 2, 2025, outlining its new war strategy to escalate armed resistance against Pakistan, an unusual silence was noted from the official media wing of the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) Bashir Zeb faction, a key component of BRAS. No statement was released for four days, raising questions about the group’s strategic direction.

During this period, a significant development emerged as the rival faction, BLA Azad — loyal to Harbyar Marri — claimed responsibility for a suicide attack targeting an FC commander in Kalat. The attack, carried out by a female suicide bomber, was attributed to BLA Azad’s Majeed Brigade. This claim was unexpected, as the Majeed Brigade has historically operated under the BLA Bashir Zeb faction, while BLA Azad had been known for low-profile attacks and lacked the capacity for sophisticated operations.

PICSS, through its sources in the conflict zone, uncovered that both factions of the BLA have secretly reconciled and agreed to cooperate. This revelation aligns with BRAS’s March 2 statement, which hinted at unifying various militant groups under a single military structure. It appears that negotiations between the two BLA factions were already in progress, culminating in a cooperative arrangement.

This breakthrough also explains the recent high-profile attack in the Manguchar area of Kalat last month, in which 18 Pakistani soldiers were killed. The attack bore the hallmarks of BLA Bashir Zeb’s operational style, puzzling observers who monitor militancy in Balochistan, as BLA Azad had not previously demonstrated the capacity to execute such a sophisticated assault. The confirmation of collaboration between the two factions now provides clarity regarding the unexpected scale and complexity of the attack.

Furthermore, it is plausible that the BLA Bashir Zeb faction may cease issuing claims under its own name, opting instead to use the BRAS platform for future responsibility claims and also ask BLA-Azad to claim some attacks. This shift would reflect BRAS’s broader strategy to present a united front, reinforcing its narrative of an organized and cohesive Baloch resistance.

The situation remains fluid, and PICSS anticipates that the full implications of this realignment will become clearer in the coming weeks.

BLF’s Sarmachar Debut: Targeting Global Audiences with Militant Rhetoric

The Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) has launched its first-ever quarterly English magazine titled Sarmachar, covering the period from November 2024 to February 2025. This magazine serves as an ideological platform to promote revolutionary struggle, national liberation, and guerrilla warfare strategies. A key highlight of this edition is Dr. Allah Nazar Baloch’s letter addressed to the United Nations, European Union, and regional powers, where he accuses Pakistan of “occupying” Balochistan, committing “genocide,” and exploiting its resources. He urges the international community to support what he terms the “legitimate armed resistance” of the Baloch nation, calling for both political and economic assistance.

The magazine also features an exclusive interview with Dr. Allah Nazar, where he reiterates his long-standing narrative that Balochistan was an independent state before its “forcible annexation” by Pakistan. He claims the BLF’s armed struggle is rooted in political and ideological motives, aiming for a secular and democratic Balochistan. Dr. Allah Nazar frames the struggle as part of a broader resistance against what he perceives as “colonial oppression” and criticizes China’s involvement through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), vowing to resist it. He dismisses the possibility of peace talks with Pakistan unless conducted under UN supervision and emphasizes that any future independent Balochistan would adopt a neutral foreign policy.

The significance of Sarmachar lies in its strategic shift towards an international audience, marking an attempt by the BLF to globalize its narrative. By publishing in English, the BLF seeks to bypass what it terms as “Pakistani state propaganda” and directly influence global public opinion and policymakers. This move reflects the BLF’s broader strategy to gain legitimacy and international recognition, framing its militant activities as part of a larger struggle for self-determination rather than insurgency. This step could impact the security landscape by amplifying BLF’s propaganda reach, potentially attracting foreign sympathizers or supporters, and reinforcing its ideological influence among Baloch youth.

TTP publishes new edition of Pashto Magazine

Last week TTP released 7^th edition of its Pashto language monthly Magazine ‘Sada-e-Taliban’. The Mujallah Sada E Taliban (Voice of the Taliban Magazine) is a monthly Pashto publication by the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which serves as a platform for the group to propagate its ideology, justify its actions, and communicate its goals to its audience. Below is a summary of the key issues raised and the main articles in its propaganda campaign based on the content of the March 2025 issue:

Key Issues Raised:

Criticism of the Pakistani Government and Military:

1. The magazine heavily criticizes the Pakistani government and military, accusing them of being puppets of Western powers, particularly the United States. It alleges that the government is corrupt, anti-Islamic, and oppressive towards its own people, especially in Pashtun-majority regions.
2. The TTP portrays itself as a resistance movement fighting against this “oppressive” regime, claiming to defend the rights of Muslims and Pashtuns.

Islamic Governance and Resistance:

1. The TTP emphasizes the need for an Islamic system of governance in Pakistan, based on Sharia law. It criticizes the current democratic system as un-Islamic and calls for its replacement with a Taliban-style Islamic Emirate.
2. The group justifies its armed struggle as a form of jihad to establish this Islamic system.

Palestine and Gaza Conflict:

1. The magazine dedicates significant attention to the Palestinian cause, particularly the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It praises the resistance of Palestinians and draws parallels between their struggle and the TTP’s fight against the Pakistani government.
2. The TTP uses the Palestinian issue to rally support among its audience, framing its own struggle as part of a broader global jihad against oppression.

Ramadan and Religious Observance:

1. The magazine highlights the importance of Ramadan, discussing its virtues and encouraging Muslims to engage in acts of worship, charity, and resistance during the holy month.
2. It uses Ramadan as a metaphor for sacrifice and perseverance, linking it to the TTP’s struggle.

TTP’s Military Operations and Victories:

1. The magazine celebrates the TTP’s military operations, claiming victories against Pakistani security forces and portraying the group as a powerful and resilient force.
2. It glorifies the sacrifices of its fighters, referring to them as martyrs and heroes.

Criticism of Pakistan’s Alleged Ties with Israel:

1. The magazine accuses Pakistan of secretly collaborating with Israel, citing alleged arms deals and diplomatic ties. It condemns this as a betrayal of the Muslim world and the Palestinian cause.

Internal Unity and Discipline:

1. The TTP addresses internal issues, calling for unity among its ranks and warning against divisions and personal ambitions. It emphasizes the importance of obedience to the group’s leadership and adherence to its ideological principles.

Condemnation of ISIS-Khorasan:

1. The TTP distances itself from ISIS-Khorasan, accusing it of being a tool of foreign intelligence agencies to destabilize the region. It denies any ideological or operational links with ISIS.

TTP’s Weekly Newspaper Manzil

The latest edition of Manzil, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan’s (TTP) two-page weekly newspaper, primarily focused on the suicide attack at Jamia Darul Uloom Haqqania in Akora Khattak, which resulted in the death of Maulana Hamidul Haq along with six others, leaving many injured. The publication accused Pakistani intelligence agencies of orchestrating the attack. It also highlighted the closure of the Torkham border and featured TTP’s claims of various attacks. Additionally, the newspaper asserted that a smaller group of fighters from South Waziristan had recently joined the TTP.

TTP Releases Video of Alleged ISI Agents’ Arrest, Threatens Punjab Police and Civilians

The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has released a 13-minute video showcasing the arrest of two individuals: Shahzaib from Ghotki, Sindh, and an elderly Pashtun man identified as Haji. Both detainees confessed to working with Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), with Shahzaib providing detailed accounts of how he was recruited by the ISI and the roles he played as an undercover agent within TTP. According to Shahzaib, his primary tasks involved sabotaging TTP’s activities in South Punjab and sowing internal discord within the group. The arrests were carried out by the Taliban Intelligence Agency (TIA), TTP’s intelligence wing.

Towards the end of the video, a masked TTP member issued a warning to civilians and Punjab police personnel, urging them to distance themselves from the ISI and its “dirty politics,” threatening consequences for those who failed to comply. While the video did not depict Shahzaib’s execution, the masked gunman explicitly stated that he would be punished accordingly.

 

Other Key Developments

Pakistan Rejects Indian Claims Over AJK, Reaffirms Support for Kashmiri Self-Determination

On March 5, 2025, India’s External Affairs Minister, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, asserted that the Kashmir dispute would be resolved with the “return of the stolen part of Kashmir which is under illegal Pakistani occupation.”

In response, Pakistan’s Foreign Office (FO) categorically rejected these remarks as “baseless claims.” FO spokesperson Shafqat Ali Khan emphasized that Jammu and Kashmir is an internationally recognized disputed territory, with its final status to be determined by a free and impartial plebiscite under UN auspices. Khan urged India to vacate the territories it has occupied for the past 77 years, aligning with UN Security Council resolutions.

The FO also dismissed India’s recent electoral exercises in the region, stating that such measures cannot substitute for the right to self-determination of the Kashmiri people. The spokesperson underscored that economic initiatives cannot address the longstanding grievances of Kashmiris, especially when implemented under coercive conditions.

Pakistan reiterated its call for a peaceful settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute, in accordance with relevant UN Security Council resolutions and the aspirations of the Kashmiri people, as essential for lasting peace in South Asia.

Arrest of ISKP Operative by Pakistan and growing US-Pakistan Counter Terrorism Cooperation

Pakistan’s recent arrest of ISKP operative Sharifullah and his subsequent handover to the United States has drawn significant international attention, with President Donald Trump and several key US officials publicly praising Pakistan’s role in counterterrorism efforts. The US has portrayed Sharifullah as the mastermind behind the Kabul Airport attack of August 2021, an attack that killed over 170 people, including 13 US soldiers, and marked one of the deadliest days during the chaotic withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan.

While the development has been hailed as a breakthrough in the fight against terrorism, there are notable complexities surrounding Sharifullah’s role. It is important to highlight that in April 2023, US authorities had previously claimed that the individual responsible for orchestrating the Kabul Airport bombing had been killed by the Taliban. This raises questions about the extent of Sharifullah’s involvement and whether he was indeed the principal architect of the attack or part of a broader network within ISKP.

Further adding to the intrigue, Sharifullah had been arrested by the former Afghan government but was freed when the Taliban stormed Bagram Jail on August 15, 2021. Remarkably, within just 10 days of his release, he was allegedly able to rise to a leadership role and mastermind a high-profile attack of such scale. The speed of his ascent raises questions about ISKP’s internal structure and operational capacity at the time, as well as the broader security vacuum that followed the fall of Kabul.

From a diplomatic perspective, Pakistan’s cooperation with the US in handing over Sharifullah could be seen as an effort to strengthen bilateral ties and underscore its commitment to counterterrorism, especially in light of past criticisms regarding its handling of militant groups. At the same time, the conflicting narratives about the identity of the attack’s mastermind reveal the murky and often contradictory nature of counterterrorism operations in the region.

Ultimately, while Sharifullah’s arrest has been framed as a victory against terrorism, the unanswered questions about his rapid rise within ISKP and the US’s earlier claims about the attack’s mastermind highlight the complex realities of the region’s militant landscape. The situation reflects the ongoing challenges in establishing clear, consistent narratives in the fight against terrorism, as well as the delicate balance Pakistan seeks to maintain in its security cooperation with the US.

Weekly Developments in and Related to Afghanistan (February 28 – March 6, 2025)

Afghanistan Declared the Most Authoritarian Country in the World

The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) has ranked Afghanistan as the most authoritarian regime globally in its Democracy Index 2024 report, placing it last among 167 countries with a score of just 0.25 out of 10. The report highlights the extreme repression under Taliban rule, surpassing Myanmar and North Korea. Afghanistan scored zero in electoral processes, government functioning, political participation, and civil liberties, reflecting the Taliban’s strict governance without a constitution and its total suppression of democratic rights.

UN to Establish Regional Centre for Afghanistan in Kazakhstan

The United Nations General Assembly has approved the establishment of a Regional Centre for Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) for Afghanistan and Central Asia in Almaty, Kazakhstan. The move, supported by 152 countries, aims to coordinate international efforts for regional development. Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev hailed the decision as a significant foreign policy achievement.

Taliban Criticizes UNAMA’s Role in Afghanistan

The Taliban has strongly criticized the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), accusing it of publishing inaccurate and negative reports about the country’s situation. Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid claimed UNAMA’s reports create a misleading image of Afghanistan and ignore the Taliban’s claimed achievements. The criticism comes ahead of UNAMA head Roza Otunbayeva’s address to the UN Security Council scheduled for March 10.

Taliban’s Push for Global Relations Based on Islamic Sharia

Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid stated that the group operates around 40 political offices worldwide and is pursuing diplomatic relations based on Islamic Sharia and mutual respect. He accused the United States and certain European countries of retaining a “mentality of war” and emphasized that the Taliban seeks formal recognition. Mujahid claimed that European countries show interest in engaging with the Taliban but are constrained by their ties with the United States.

Fifth Anniversary of the Doha Agreement: Taliban Declares It Obsolete

Marking the fifth anniversary of the Doha Agreement signed with the US in 2020, the Taliban has dismissed the accord as irrelevant. Zabihullah Mujahid stated that the Taliban now governs Afghanistan independently, without adhering to the agreement’s terms. While accusing the US of failing to honor its commitments, including lifting sanctions on Taliban leaders, Mujahid emphasized that the group no longer sees the Doha Agreement as binding.

Russia and China Discuss Afghanistan and Regional Security Cooperation

Senior Russian and Chinese officials, Sergei Shoigu and Wang Yi, met in Beijing to discuss security cooperation and the situation in Afghanistan. Both countries, though maintaining diplomatic ties with the Taliban, have yet to officially recognize its government. The talks highlighted growing regional collaboration on security matters, with plans for further strategic dialogue.

Taliban Strengthens Economic Ties with India via Chabahar Port

In a meeting between the Taliban’s representative in Iran, Fazl Mohammad Haqqani, and Indian Ambassador Rudra Gaurav, both sides discussed boosting trade through Chabahar port. This move aims to strengthen economic cooperation between Afghanistan and India, bypassing Pakistan. The meeting reflects the Taliban’s ongoing efforts to build ties with India despite regional tensions.

Iran Deports 1,800 Undocumented Afghans Daily

Iran has reported deporting around 1,800 undocumented Afghan migrants daily from its Khorasan Razavi province. Governor Gholam Hossein Mozaffari highlighted the need for better regulation of Afghan migration, urging joint investments in border areas to reduce illegal crossings. Despite legal migration routes, many Afghans remain in Iran after their visas expire.

Clashes Between Pakistani Forces and Taliban Displace Thousands at Torkham Border

Ongoing clashes between Pakistani forces and Taliban fighters at the Torkham border crossing have displaced approximately 15,000 people. The fighting erupted over the Taliban’s construction of a new checkpoint, prompting border closures since February 21. The closure has stranded 5,000 trucks carrying goods, resulting in an estimated $15 million in economic losses.

Nangarhar Province Bans Use of Pakistani Rupees

The Taliban governor of Nangarhar province has banned the use of Pakistani Rupees (PKR) in commercial transactions across the province’s border districts, instructing local authorities to enforce the use of Afghan Afghani (AFN) instead. The move underscores the Taliban’s effort to assert greater economic sovereignty amid tense relations with Pakistan.

Anti-Taliban Front Declares Ceasefire for Ramadan

The Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF) announced a temporary ceasefire during Ramadan, halting military operations against the Taliban unless provoked. While the group continues its intelligence activities, the ceasefire signals a tactical pause, allowing the Taliban and the opposition to regroup during the holy month.

Afghan Jihadi Leader Urges Taliban to Form Islamic Council for Leadership Selection

During a visit to Iran, Afghan jihadi leader Abdul Rab Rasul Sayyaf urged the Taliban to form a Shurā-ye Ḥall wa ‘Aqd — an Islamic council — to select Afghanistan’s leader, rather than continuing their rule without public endorsement. Sayyaf emphasized that legitimacy requires an inclusive Islamic process, indirectly challenging the Taliban’s unilateral grip on power.

Taliban Expands Military Reform Commission

The Taliban’s Military Reform Commission has been upgraded to prevent its fighters from joining other jihadist factions or inviting foreign militants to Afghanistan. Led by Mawlawi Attaullah, the commission includes members from the intelligence and defense ministries, reinforcing internal control to curb any alliances with external extremist groups.